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Abstract
This study is intended to find out the motives of cash holding in Chinese firms and theories
associated with these motives. The study is unique because it not only estimates the
adjustment speed of corporate cash holdings but also discuss several firm specific factors
that affects cash holdings in Chinese firms with special reference to Chinese SOEs and
NSOEs. An extensive set of panel data comprising 1632 A listed Chines firms, over a period
from 2001 to 2013 are taken for analysis. The study reports a lower adjustment coefficient
for Chinese firms compared to other developed nations. The study finds that target level of
cash holdings in Chinese firms is better explained by Trade off and Pecking order theories.
To cope with issues of endogeneity and serial correlation the study apply GMM and random
effects model with an added AR (autoregressive) term.
JEL Classification: M41, G34
Keywords: Corporate Cash Holdings, Adjustment Speed, Chinese Firms, Agency Theory,
Pecking Order theory, Two Steps GMM
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1. Introduction
Brigham and Daves (2004) argue that 1.5 % of assets are held as cash on average by
industrial firms. Lee and Song empirically found that after the Asian Financial crises the
firms in Asia have increased their cash holdings and showed less attraction towards
leverage. However whether this level of cash holdings is optimal for the firms is an
important question to be addressed. Why these firms opt for huge cash holdings when cash
in itself is a non interest generating asset. Furthermore there is a lack of research on this
issue in emerging markets as very few studies have been conducted to address this question
of why firms hold huge amount of cash in emerging markets. As far as China is concerned
its market are unique in its financing alternatives and ownership structure.
Being the world second largest economy China makes a unique setting to study the
corporate cash holdings. China has less sophisticated capital markets as compared to other
developed nations of the world and the major financing alternatives are bank loans.
Moreover the situation becomes more complex while considering the fact of SOEs and
NSOEs. Guo et al (2013) reported that by end of September 2006, largest shareholders who
held 56% of shares were state shares controlled by Chinese government and other state asset
management companies. Until 1998, the largest Chinese banks (most of them were state
owned) were advised not to give credit to Chinese private companies. It was because of low
political stature of these companies. Since 1998, these impediments in financing due to
political pecking order should have been alleviated. However research evidence suggest that
financing constraints for private Chinese companies are still there due to social and political
factors(Huang 2003).Numerous research studies indicate that financial constraints are
impediments to investment, growth and survival of the company(Stein 2003,Hubbard 1998).
This implies that Chinese firms (especially private firms) have fewer alternatives of debt
financing. This makes this study more important from the point of view that private firms
have fewer alternatives to raise external capital, so naturally these firms will tend to hold
excess cash but to which degree will imply to be the optimal cash holdings for Chinese
firms. Ownership concentration is another unique feature of Chinese firms. Chinese
companies are highly concentrated in term of ownership concentration. A single largest
owner holds about 36% of an average company share, while 52% shares are held by five
biggest owners (Guo et al 2013). This higher ownership concentration will affect the
decision making process regarding Chinese firms. Thus due to investment attractiveness and
possible conflicts in decision making process makes this study very important to study the
behavior of Chinese firms with respect to their financial decision making.
The study uses a rich data set of 1632 firms divided into state-owned and non-state owned
firms. The data covers a period from 2001 to 2013. The rest of the study is organized as
follows. Section 1 provides review of published literature, followed by discussion on various
determinants of corporate cash holdings and their related hypothesis. Section three provides
research methodology, followed by discussion of results and conclusion.
2. Review of Prior Studies
Theoretically speaking firms hold cash due to several motives. Keynes (1936) argued that
three motives drive the demand for money. These motives are transactionary, precautionary
and speculative motives. Convenience and confidence is provided by first two motives while
motive of speculations provide money yield. Cash is held by corporations to meet day to day
demand and to manage operations. Thus demand for cash is raised due to the difference in
cash inflow and cash outflow. This motive for cash is termed as transactionary motive.
Money is also held as a safety margin for some unforeseen events and future uncertainties.
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In speculative motive money is held by the corporations for earning profit. However holding
excess cash has its costs. This cost is the opportunity cost. Holding excess cash may leads to
agency conflicts between firm’s management and shareholders (Jensen, 1986). Moreover
Bates et al. (2009) and Foley et al. (2007) argue that cash is held for tax purposes.
Thus to measure the optimal cash balance, a firm must make a tradeoff between holding
excess level of cash and the associated costs. Excess cash has numerous alternatives for
investment. It can be invested in short term marketable securities, however they may
provide liquidity to firms but they report very low after tax returns. Concentrating on the
determinant factors of holding cash managers can be able to make necessary adjustments
about the level of cash to attain an optimal cash level.
Different studies which analyzed cash holdings and its determinants with reference to target
level of cash holdings are consistent with studies on leverage (Jani et al., 2004). Frictionless
capital market assumption makes holding cash by firms irrelevant. But this assumption can
be relaxed owing to modern trends in cash holdings (Drobetz et al., 2010). By considering
transaction costs, agency problems and information asymmetry, the debate on corporate
cash holdings features trade off theory and pecking order theory by Meyars(1984) and free
cash flow hypothesis by Jensen (1986) very prominently.
2.1.Firm Characteristics
This study follows Opler et al. (1999). They reported various cash holdings’ determinants in
US firms. Following section provides a debate on the relationship of various determinants
with cash holdings.
2.1.1. Growth Opportunities
It is very difficult to value even the projects with positive NPV since these projects are not
yet realized and there is a factor of intangibility involved (Ozkan and Ozkan 2004). Thus
valuing such firms is a difficult task because their value will depend upon the realization of
these opportunities (D’Mello et al., 2008). Pecking order theory suggests that firms with
higher growth opportunities need higher cash level to cope with any shortfall in cash.
Furthermore tradeoff theory predicts that a firm will need higher level of cash to avoid
financial distress in time of better growth opportunities. Thus to avoid any shortfall in cash
is in accordance with tranasctionary motives of cash (Opler et al., 1999). Second motive of
avoiding financial distress is consistent with motive of precaution (Bates et al., 2009). But
inverse relationship of growth opportunities with corporate cash holdings is reported in
numerous studies (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Jani et al., 2004; Bates et al., 2009), which
corresponds to agency theory. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) reason that firms characterized by
low growth opportunities may invest even in projects having negative net present value.
Entrenched management and poor growth prospects compel firms to hoard more cash for
use; but during funds’ raising these firms will tend to conceal detailed information from
investors, disclosure of which is mandatory by regulatory authorities (Jani et al., 2004; Bates
et al., 2009).this isin line with agency theory because in such cases cash is accumulated due
to agency problems (Bates et al. 2009).
Thus relationship of growth opportunities with corporate cash holding is unclear. This study
follows Hill et al. (2010) in measurement of growth opportunities. Growth opportunities are
measured by market to book ratio which is obtained by dividing the book value of total
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, on book value of
assets.

22

AABFJ | Volume 9, no. 4, 2015

Alternative Hypothesis (H1a): Growth Opportunities significantly affects corporate cash
holdings of a firm.

2.1.2. Firm Size
According to Titman and Wessels (1988) economies of scale which can be achieved through
corporate cash management makes smaller firms to be more financially distressed.
Moreover, smaller firms are characterized with information asymmetry (Ozkan and Ozkan,
2004). This makes rising of external funds more costly for these firms (Ferreira and Vilela,
2004). Bigger firms have the privilege of better credit rating, thus they have bank credit line
(opler et al. 1999). These two facts greatly help larger firms to obtain external financing
with ease. Thus larger firms can obtain large amount of capital, and they are better
positioned to reap the benefits of economies of scale (D’Mello et al., 2008). Therefore
tradeoff theory predicts that size has an inverse relationship with corporate cash holdings.
This motive of holding cash corresponds to transaction motive (Bates et al., 2009). However
due to positive effects of size on profit, bigger sized firms are expected to be more
successful. Hence, these firms will tend to accumulate more cash than smaller firms after
controlling for their investment (Opler et al., 1999, Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Jani et al.,
2004). This shows that in contrast to our previous debate pecking order theory predicts a
direct relationship of size with corporate cash holdings. Furthermore larger firms have high
dispersion of ownership which reduces the chances of takeovers thus giving managers
discretion in their financial decision making (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Thus a direct
relationship of with corporate cash holdings is predicted by agency theory.
Based on the prediction of these three theories size can affect corporate cash holding either
in positive or negative way. Natural log of firm’s total assets is used to measure firm’s size.
Alternative Hypothesis (H2a): Size has a significant effect on corporate cash holdings.
2.1.3. Cash flow
Cash flow is a liquidity source and it reduces excess cash holdings needs (Ferreira and
Vilela, 2004). Thus trade off theory predicts that cash flow negatively affects cash holdings.
But Ferreira and Vilela (2004) argue higher cash flow’s firms will reserve most of it as
cash. Thus according to pecking order theory cash flow is expected to positively affect
corporate cash holdings. Deloof (2003) argues that cash flow is a readily available source of
cash and firms which utilize their liquid reserves to finance their projects will tend to
accumulate more cash from their free cash flows. This is further confirmed by Garcia-Teruel
and Martinez-Solano (2008) who highlight that firms with larger cash flows are expected to
have higher cash levels. .This is according to the financing motive of cash holdings.
However cash can also be held from cash flows as a precaution to finance operation in time
of less liquidity (Deloof, 2003).
Thus these two theories give contrasting arguments about the relationship between corporate
cash holdings and cash flow. This implies an ambiguous relationship of cash flow with cash
holdings. This study follows Hill et al. (2010) in measuring the cash flow. Cash flow is
EBIT plus depreciation and amortization minus, interest expense, tax charges and any
common dividend paid. For purpose of scaling this value is then divided by total assets.
Alternative Hypothesis (H3a): Cash flows significantly affects corporate cash holdings
2.1.4. Leverage
Financial distress and bankruptcy are two important attributes associated with leverage.
Chances of bankruptcy are higher when debt level increases. Deloof (2003) argues that
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firms having high leverage need to accumulate excess cash to cope with bankruptcy. This
reduced possibility of bankruptcy is in accordance with precautionary motive of firm for
holding more cash. Thus leverage is going to positively influence corporate cash holding,
which is in accordance with trade off theory. However, Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and
D’Mello et al. (2008) argue that leverage is a proxy for firm’s ability to raise more debt.
Thus highly levered firms are expected to hoard less cash. This accounts that corporate cash
holding is negatively affected by leverage. According to pecking order theory and
arguments put forward by Opler et al. (1999) and Jani et al. (2004), debt is issued in
situations when a firm has used up all of the retained earnings. Thus cash level of a firm
usually falls if its investment needs are higher than its retained earnings and vice versa. One
important fact in this regard is that firm’s high leverage can be used as a proxy for its access
to the debt market (John, 1993). In the context of agency theory according to Ferreira and
Vilela (2004) managers tend to hold more cash because cash is safer than debt. Furthermore
Jensen (1986) argues that entrenched management is happy to hold more cash in time of
poor investment opportunities rather than to distribute it to shareholders as dividends.
Higher level of cash may be used by for personal benefits even they might invest in projects
having negative NPV, because these projects are immune from scrutiny by financial market
participants.
Thus based upon above discussion of these three theories, leverage can affect corporate cash
holdings in both positive as well as negative way. This study follows Faulkender and Wang
(2006) in measuring leverage. Leverage is measured by dividing firm’s long term debt
which also includes firm’s short term borrowing on firm’s long-term debt plus market
capitalization.
Alternative Hypothesis (H4a): Leverage and corporate cash holdings have a significant
relationship.
2.1.5. Net working capital
In the context of liquidity, networking capital acts as a substitute for firm’s liquidity.
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and D’Mello et al (2008), argue that according to tradeoff theory
firms having high NWC will hoard less cash because NWC in itself a source of liquidity
and can be liquidated when a need arises for the firm. This corresponds to transaction
motive of firm for holding higher cash level. Thus tradeoff theory predicts that networking
capital is expected to negatively affect cash holdings. But there is also possibility that this
relationship is positive. One important attribute in this regard is firm cash conversion cycle.
Firm having shorter CCC will have higher liquidity and thus they will need to hold less cash
for precautionary motives. Jani et al. (2004) are more pragmatic in arguing that shorter CCC
frees up cash and thus automatically increase firm’s cash holdings.
Thus how NWC affects cash holdings is ambiguous as discussed above. NWC is measured
by subtracting accounts payable from the sum of accounts receivables and inventory. The
value is then scaled by total assets.
Alternative Hypothesis (H5a): Firms liquidity significantly affects corporate cash holdings.
2.1.6. Capital expenditure
Firms hold more cash if they have higher need of capital expenditure (Opler et al. 1999). In
the context of static trade off theory this relationship holds because a firm having higher
cash level or having more liquid assets will be better positioned in fulfilling its need of
capital expenditure. Bates et al. (2009) report same relationship and argue that capital
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expenditure is a proxy for financial distress cost, thus suggesting that capital expenditure is
going to positively affect cash holdings. Two important costs associated with raising capital
are the transaction cost and opportunity cost. Jani et al. (2004) argue that these two costs are
associated with firms having less cash or liquid assets, thus firms will hold more cash rather
than raising external capital. On the other hand Opler et al. (1999) put forward their
arguments based on pecking order theory that firms will use up cash if they have high
capital expenditure need and as a result they will report low cash levels. These firms
accumulate less cash with few internal resources (Jani et al., 2004). Thus a negative
relationship is predicted by pecking order theory. Furthermore Bates et al. (2009) argue that
firms may use capital expenditure to create assets for collateral use for raising debt. This
will give an opportunity of raising more debt to managers and firm will have increased debt
capacity which will in turn decrease demand for cash. They further quote Riddick and
Whited (2009) that an abrupt increase in demand may induce increase productivity which
will increase capital expenditure in short run. So an increase in short term investment is
expected which will in turn decrease the ability of firm to hold more cash.
From the above discussion it can be concluded that CAPEX hold either positive or negative
relationship with corporate cash holdings. CAPEX is measured as change in value of
tangible fixed assets from time t-1 to time t (Ross et al., 2008). Depreciation is added to this
value and then divided by total assets for scaling purpose.
Alternative Hypothesis (H6a): Corporate cash holdings can be affected both positively as
well as negatively by capital expenditure.
2.1.7. Board Characteristics
To safeguard the interests of minority shareholders is the responsibility of board of directors
through effective management and monitoring mechanism as argued by (Kusnadi, 2007). As
for as board characteristics are concerned two important attributes considered by various
studies in the effectiveness of board are board’s size and board’s independence. Studies
conducted in emerging markets like Malaysia have reported the ineffectiveness of board
characteristics such as board independence in overall improvement on corporate governance
to ensure that minority shareholders’ rights are protected. Important studies conducted in
this regard include Wan-Hussin (2009).Because of the reasons discussed this study has
included board size and board independence to study in what manner board is effective with
regard to corporate decision making of corporate cash holdings.
2.1.8. Board Size
Managers who are effectively monitored by board have a tendency of not investing in
projects having negative net present value. This reduces the accumulation of cash in these
firms. However Lee and Lee (2009) argue that larger boards are prone to get involved in
lengthy and inefficient decision making process. As a consequence of this beaurocratic
nature of the decision making process these boards loses control on their managers who in
turn give the managers an opportunity to hold more cash. This corresponds to a positive
relationship between board size and corporate cash holdings. This study measures board size
simply by taking the overall number of directors on the board.
Alternative Hypothesis (H7a): Board size positively affects corporate cash holdings.
2.1.9. Board Independence
Researchers agree to the fact that by increasing board independence results in an effective
monitoring and oversight on managers. But the studies conducted on the role of board
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independence have largely been ineffective. Weisbach (1988) argue that board
independence enhance independent decision making and hence independent boards are able
to replace ineffective and inefficient managers to improve firm’s performance. This shows
that board independence reduces managerial opportunism and consequently higher level of
board independence ensures lower corporate cash holdings. However Bhagat and Black
(2002) reports ineffectiveness of board independence in monitoring the management of a
firm. Romano (2005) clearly highlights this discrepancy by arguing that hiring process of
independent directors may be ambiguous. There is a possibility that independent directors
are hired by managers just to fulfill the regulatory requirements. Moreover the theory of
managerial hegemony argues that there is a shift in firm’s control from shareholders to
managers and directors are just a “rubber stamp” for managerial decisions making (Mace,
1971; Vance, 1983; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Cornforth, 2002). Thus there exists the
possibility that despite of presence of an independent board managers still have the privilege
of managerial opportunism resulting in higher level of cash holdings.
Based on the above discussion it can be concluded that board independence can affect firm’s
cash holding in either way, i.e. positive or negative. Board independence is measured simply
by taking the number of independent directors on the board.
Alternative Hypothesis (H8a): There is a significant relationship between corporate cash
holdings and board in dependence of a firm.
3. Research Methodology
3.1.Data and Data Source
The study uses a rich data set of 1634 A listed firms of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock
Exchange extended over a 13 years period from 2001 to 2013. Data ranges from code
C00002 to C600918 mainly collected from RESET database. Firms having minimum 6
years of data are included in analysis in order to avoid survivorship biases posed due to
elimination of firms with missing data.
3.2.Model Specification
We follow the static model of Opler et al. (1999) to analyze the relationship between
identified variables and corporate cash holdings. The model in modified form is given as
follows.

CASH it   0    1 MTBit   2 SIZE it   3 OCFit   4 LEVit   5 NWC it

 6 CAPEX it   7 BSIZE it   8 BINDit  eit
(1)

In equation (1)
is the sum of cash and marketable securities of firm i at time t scaled by total
CASH it
assets.
MTBit
is the ration of market value and book value of firm i at time t.
is the natural log of total assets of firm i at time t scaled by total assets.
 2 SIZEit

OCFit

is cash flow from operation of firm i at time t scaled by total assets.
26

AABFJ | Volume 9, no. 4, 2015

LEVit

is the market leverage of firm i at time t.

CAPEX it
BSIZE it
BINDit

is the capital expenditure of firm i at time t scaled by total assets.
is the total number of directors of firm i at time t.

is the total number of independent directors of firm i at time t.
is the error term.
eit
However two important issue related to model (1) is the engoneity between leverage and
corporate cash reserves (D’Mello et al., 2008) and adjustment made by firms to achieve a
target level of cash holdings (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). Endogeneity can be addressed by
applying valid instruments for leverage prediction. But the adjustment of firms for target
level cash cannot be immediately achieved due to the associated adjustment costs. This
implies to following relationship between current cash holdings and cash holdings at time t1.

CASH it  CASH it 1   (CASH it  CASH it 1 )

(2)

In equation (2), ( CASH it  CASH it 1 ) represents adjustment needed to achieve a target
cash level  is the adjustment speed of a firm to achieve target level of cash. Thus the term
 takes value from 0 to 1.If  =0, it means CASH it = CASH t 1 . This implies that the firm
wants to remain with the same level of cash due to high cost of adjustment to achieve a
target level of corporate cash holdings. However if  =1 then CASH it = CASH it* . This infers
that in such a case a firm will opt to achieve its target level of cash immediately.
By putting equation (1), in equation (2) we get

CASH it   0  (1   )CASH it 1  1 MTBit   2 SIZEit   3 OCFit   4 LEVit
  5 NWCit   6 CAPEX it   7 BSIZEit   8 BIND   i  t  eit

(3)

In the above equation  i correspond to firm specific effects and t are the time specific
effects.
Equation (3) can be rewritten in simplified form as follow.

CASH it    CASH it 1   1 MTBit   2 SIZEit   3 OCFit   4 LEVit   5 NWCit
  6 CAPEX it   7 BSIZEit   8 BINDit   i  t   it

(4)

In equation (4)    0 ;   (1   );  k   k ; and t it  eit
Due to the problem of endgoeneity between leverage and cash holdings and firm’s
adjustment to achieve the target level of cash, using OLS to estimate equation (4) will be
inconsistent. In order to address these issues this study applies two steps Generalized
Method of Moments( GMM) estimator to estimate equation(4).Two-step GMM is selected
since in term of efficiency it is better than One-step GMM.
4. Findings and Analysis
The study uses regression analysis as a statistical tool for estimating the models. Ordinary
Least Square regression and random effects regression with AR (2) term is used to estimate
the models. AR (2) is used to account for possible serial correlation. Finally GMM is used to
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account for problem of endogeneity between leverage and cash and firm’s adjustment to
achieve a target level of cash.
The descriptive statistics are given in table 1 for overall firms, SOEs and NSOEs,
represented with their number of observation, mean and standard deviation.
The descriptive statistics reveals that mean value of cash for overall firms at time t is
0.666692, which is equal to about 6.6 % of Chines Yuan given that one Chinese Yuan is
equal to 10 units. This value is much lower as compared to studies conducted in developed
nations like US by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Drobetz et al. (2010). Furthermore
mean value for cash for NSOEs is greater than SOEs. This shows that NSOEs tend to hold
more cash given that prevalent loans in the market are directed towards SOEs. This
corresponds to pecking order of loans towards SOEs by the creditors (Huang 2003).
Descriptive statistics shows different value of mean of cash for individual sectors. To find
out whether this difference in means is statistically significant the study follows
Wasiuzzaman and Arumugam (2013) and conduct a Non Parametric Kruskal–Wallis Test
(Kruskal and Wallis, 1952). The results are shown in Table 2.
The Kruskal–Wallis test statistic shows statistical significance of mean difference between
SOEs and NSOEs. The p value for the test is 0.000 which shows statistical significance at
99% level. The highest rank is shown for State owned Enterprises. This concludes that
corporate cash holdings for NSOEs are higher than SOEs.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Overall
Variable Obs
Mean
Std. Dev. Obs
LEV
21944 0.224374 0.150911
9566
MTB
24987 2.518086 2.490207
10350
CASH
25318 0.666692 0.443969
10797
CAPEX
25723 0.023783 0.047603
10797
NWC
25700 0.18314 0.170456
10793
BSIZE
21695 11.27615 4.550996
10226
BIND
19707 3.698787 1.505934
9754
SIZE
25720 20.88725 1.715709
10796
OCF
25318 0.666692 0.443969
10640
Table Key
LEV
Leverage
MTB
Market to book ratio
CAPEX
Capital Expenditure
NWC
Networking Capital
BSIZE
Board Size
BIND
Board Independence
Cash
OCF
flow
Obs
Observations
SOE
state owned Enterprises
NSOE
Non state Owned Enterprises
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NSOE
Mean
0.232431
3.092211
0.1934
0.023169
0.186752
11.44211
3.712528
21.14644
0.645874

Std. Dev. Obs
0.153625
12378
2.546376
14637
0.383511
14926
0.045986
14926
0.164075
14907
4.43668
11469
1.513192
9953
1.300129
14924
0.426481
14678

SOE
Mean
0.218148
2.112116
0.192015
0.024226
0.180525
11.12817
3.685321
20.69975
0.681782

Std. Dev.
0.148486
2.367193
0.4724
0.048735
0.17489
4.645748
1.498741
1.940804
0.455647
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Table 2:

Non parametric Kruskal–Wallis Test Results

Sector

Observations

No of
Firms

SOE
10797
NSOE
14926
*** shows significance at 99%

%of
Firms

702
932

Rank
Sum

Mean
Cash

43% 1.41E+08
53% 1.90E+08

Kruskal-Wallis
Test

0.1920 chi‐squared
0.1943

14.286***

The correlation matrix corresponding to all variables with their respective VIF (Variance
Inflation Factor) is given in table 3.
Table 3: Correlation
Analysis
Variables
MTB

MTB

CASH

CAPEX

NWC

LEV

CF

SIZE

BIND

CASH(L1)

VIF*
1.04

CASH

0.06

1

CAPEX

‐0.05

‐0.18

_
1

1.07

NWC

0.03

‐0.07

‐0.31

1

LEV

‐0.06

‐0.37

0.11

‐0.04

1

1.21
1.16

OCF

‐0.05

0.07

0.12

‐0.07

‐0.15

1

SIZE

‐0.16

‐0.11

0.05

‐0.07

0.08

0.08

1

1.06
1.11

BIND

0.01

‐0.09

0.04

‐0.03

0.03

0.03

0.24

1

BSIZE

0.05

‐0.16

0.04

‐0.05

0.12

‐0.03

0.15

0.57

0.01 0.662
‐0.18 ‐0.02
*VIF is the Variance Inflation
Factor

‐0.31

0.08

‐0.09

‐0.07

CASH(L1)

BSIZE

1

1.56
1
‐0.13

1.54
1

1.16

Two important features of this table are correlation coefficients and VIF (variance inflation
factor) of different variables. From the table 3 it can be concluded that there is no issue of
multicolinearty. All the correlation coefficient are much lower except for lagged cash value
CASH (L1)) where it is 0.662 and board size (BSIZE) which is 0.576. But the VIF values
are in acceptable ranges since VIF corresponds to severity of multicolinearity.
After having no strong case for multicolinearity the study conducted pooled regression
analysis to show the relationship between dependent and independent variables. Table 4
reports results for overall firms and the theories supported by these results. Table 5 and 6
report results for state-owned and non-state owned enterprises. Results for static model of
equation 1 are obtained by using OLS and random effects with an added AR term to cope
with the problem of serial correlation. The results for the dynamic model of equation 4 are
obtained by running Generalized Method of Moments Regression (GMM). Column one of
table 4, 5 and 6 represents the GLS regression with an added AR term. Column 2 represents
the GMM regression while Column 3 represents the OLS regression results.
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4.1.Discussion of Results
The discussion focuses on columns 1 and 2 of tables 4, 5, 6
The results indicate a positive and statistically significant lagged cash (dependent) variable.
From this it can be inferred that firms pursue a target amount of cash holdings after making
a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of holding more cash.
The dynamic GMM estimator in column 2 shows that adjustment coefficient  for overall
firms is 0.45. It means firms in China takes approximately 4.5 years to adjust to their target
level of cash.
This adjustment speed is relatively less as compared adjustment speed found by Ozkan and
Ozkan (2004) for UK’s firms (0.605), Guney et al. (2003) for French firms and Japanese
(0.561) firms. The adjustment coefficient for State owned enterprises (0.47) is higher than
non-state-owned enterprises.
Apart from adjustment speed the effect of other firm specific characteristics on corporate
cash holdings is also tested. The results for overall firms show that networking capital
(NWC), capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and leverage (LEV) have negative and statistically
significant relationship.
Adjustment coefficient for state owned enterprises is 0.42 (table 5) while for non state
owned enterprises its 0.47 (Table 6) This means state-owned enterprises in China takes
relatively more time to adjust to their target cash levels.
These results are consistent with pecking order theory and findings of Opler et al. (1999),
Jani et al. (2004) and Bates et al. (2009).
Debt financing is only considered when retained earnings are exhausted and vice versa. This
follows that corporate cash holdings actually fall when investment need is higher than
retained earnings and cash holding level rises when investment need is less than retained
earnings.
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Table4: Regression Output (Overall Firms)
Predicted
Sign
GLS (AR1)
Coef.

GMM
Coef.

Coef.

MTB

(+/‐)

0.0034***
(0.0003)

(0.0004)

(0.0003)

CAPEX

(+/‐)

‐0.490***

‐0.6915

‐0.322***

(0.0391)

(0.1216)

(0.0352)

NWC

(+/‐)

‐0.211***

‐0.0807***

‐0.125**

(0.0078)

(0.01453)

(0.0058)

LEV

(+/‐)

‐0.243***

‐0.154***

‐0.146***

(0.0074)

(0.0178)

(0.0054)

BIND

(+/‐)

0.0013*

‐0.00029

0.0003

(0.0007)

(0.0011)

(0.0006)

BSIZE

+

‐0.002***

0.0013*

‐0.0018**

(0.0003)

(0.0005)

(0.0002)

SIZE

(+/‐)

‐0.004***

‐0.0142**

‐0.003***

(0.0012)

(0.0058)

(0.0006)

OCF

(+/‐)

0.00291***

OLS

0.0022***

‐0.030***

‐0.056***

0.0033*

(0.0030)

(0.0104)

(0.0018)

0.047***

0.5564**

0.589***

(0.0069)

(0.0139)

(0.0062)

_cons

0.4201***

0.638***

0.1832***

Wald chi2
Durbin‐
Watson
Baltagi‐Wu
LBI
Breusch and
Pagan
Adj R‐
squared

2545***

546.89***

CASH(L1)

1.3747
1.8600
190.8900
0.4774

standard errors are in
parenthesis
***,**,* indicates statistical significance at 99%,95%, and 90% respectively
TOT

Trade off Theory

POT

Pecking Order Theory

FCF

Free Cash flow Theory
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Theory
Supported
POT/TOT
POT
TOT
POT/TOT/FCF
FCF
FCF
POT
POT
POT/TOT
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Table5: Regression Output (State Owned Enterprises)
GLS (AR1)
GMM
Coef.
Coef.
MTB
0.0042***
0.022***
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
CAPEX
‐0.232***
‐0.0353
(0.0417)
(0.1422)
NWC
‐0.183***
‐0.254***
(0.0112)
(0.0216)
LEV
‐0.265***
‐0.104***
(0.0103)
(0.0184)
BIND
0.002*
‐0.0002
(0.0010)
(0.0012)
BSIZE
‐0.002***
0.0001
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
SIZE
‐0.0087***
0.015***
(0.0016)
(0.0035)
CF
‐0.033***
‐0.026**
(0.0041)
(0.0077)
CASH(L1)
0.061***
0.53***
(0.0097)
(0.0123)
_cons
0.500***
‐0.195***
Wald chi2
1367.28***
665.26**
Durbin‐Watson
1.335
Baltagi‐Wu LBI
1.83
Breusch and Pagan
120.9***
Adj R‐squared

OLS
Coef.
0.0036***
(0.0005)
‐0.287***
(0.0419)
‐0.048***
(0.0067)
‐0.159***
(0.0075)
0.0015*
(0.0008)
‐0.002***
(0.0003)
‐0.004***
(0.0009)
‐0.0033
(0.0024)
0.573***
(0.0089)
0.2382***

0.4741

standard errors are in parenthesis
***,**,* indicates statistical significance at 99%,95%, and 90% respectively

32

AABFJ | Volume 9, no. 4, 2015

Table6: Regression Output (Non‐state Owned Enterprises)
GLS (AR1)
GMM
Coef.
Coef.
MTB
0.0027***
0.0028***
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
CAPEX
‐2.008***
‐0.327**
(0.1034)
(0.1517)
NWC
‐0.249***
‐0.300***
(0.0108)
(0.0253)
LEV
‐0.217***
‐0.081**
(0.0106)
(0.0203)
BIND
0.0006
0.0002
(0.0010)
(0.0013)
BSIZE
‐0.0019***
0.0006
(0.0005)
(0.0007)
SIZE
‐0.0014
0.0261***
(0.0017)
(0.0042)
OCF
‐0.0150***
‐0.0500
(0.0042)
(0.0095)
CASH(L1)
0.0583***
0.584***
(0.0100)
(0.0146)
_cons
0.3735***
‐0.407***
Wald chi2
1536.8***
565.63***
Durbin‐Watson
1.4200
‐
Baltagi‐Wu LBI
1.9010
‐
Breusch and Pagan
93.56***
Adj R‐squared

OLS
Coef.
0.0014**
(0.0005)
‐1.1560
(0.0757)
‐0.117***
(0.0070)
‐0.134***
(0.0076)
0.0005
(0.0009)
‐0.002***
(0.0003)
‐0.0022**
(0.0009)
0.010***
(0.0026)
0.574***
(0.0089)
0.206***

0.5141

standard errors are in parenthesis
***,**,* indicates statistical significance at 99%,95%, and 90% respectively

5. Concluding Remarks
This is study is unique from the point of view that it not only adjustment speed of but also
investigate various determinants of cash holdings in Chinese firms with special reference to
Chinese SOEs and NSOEs. An extensive set of panel data comprising 1634 A listed Chinese
firms, over a period from 2001 to 2013 is taken for analysis. The adjustment coefficient for
Chinese firms is relatively low compared to studies conducted in developed countries.
Furthermore adjustment speed is relatively lower for NSOEs than SOEs.
The study also finds firm’s characteristics that influence corporate cash holdings. Growth
opportunities are found to influence cash positively because of associated information
asymmetry of investment opportunities. Networking capital, leverage and capital
expenditure show a negative relationship with corporate cash holdings corresponding to
pecking order theory. An ambiguous relationship for board independence is found while
board characteristics show a negative significant relationship which indicates the
33
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effectiveness of board size in Chinese firms. Operating cash flow shows a negative
relationship in consistency with pecking order theory because Chinese firms take the cash
flow as readily available source of financing, thus avoiding costly external financing. Size
negatively affects corporate cash holdings indicating that bigger sized firm have better
alternative of financing due to their market reputation.
The study has its limitations. It may have added other board characteristics such as CEO
duality and ownership concentration to show their effect on cash holdings. However study
tries to address the issue of endogeneity by using two steps GMM.
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